As a constitutional monarchy, Persia maintained neutrality throughout the war. Yet, situated strategically between Asia and Europe, and possessing abundant petroleum reserves, it became a focal point in the rivalry between the belligerents. The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 carved the nation into northern and southern spheres of influence, with Russia actively supporting the Persian monarch. Persia’s internal politics, fragmented by tribal allegiances and regional power centers, left the monarchy dependent on foreign support, while local elites often aligned opportunistically with whichever external power could secure their interests. This created a fertile environment for espionage and influence, which Germany and the Central Powers would soon seek to exploit. From 1910 onwards, Russian Cossacks were dispatched to aid the Shah, engaging rebellious tribes and bandits in the monarch's name. This assistance seemingly aligned with Russia's political objectives in the region.

The Central Powers, harboring their own aspirations for Persia, pursued a policy aimed at unsettling Britain and Russia. Their strategy sought to foment disturbances in Persia, thereby liberating the nation from Entente influence. The German plan unfolded with straightforward precision. Agents, generously funded and armed, would mobilize local levies and sow anarchy across the land. At the forefront of this operation stood consular officers in Persia, Wilhelm Wassmuss, known as the "German Lawrence," and Count Kaunitz, who leveraged alliances with influential Persian tribes, exploiting local grievances against Russian and British dominance. His approach combined financial incentives, gifts, and promises of autonomy, creating a network of loyal tribal forces ready to challenge Entente influence. Beyond their direct activities, Berlin also attempted to rally the Persian political elite through promises of independence and modern statehood, which resonated with many reformists in Tehran and among regional leaders who resented Russian dominance.

Enver Pasha, in contemplation of his own stratagems, saw an opportunity in the defeat of the Russians within the pivotal cities of Persia. This conquest, he believed, would pave the path to Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and ultimately, India. Thus, the invasion of Persia emerged as the inaugural manoeuvre in Enver's expansive pan-Turanian vision. German planners in Berlin viewed Enver’s designs with a mixture of enthusiasm and apprehension. On the one hand, his Pan-Turanian ideology seemed to align with their wider anti-Russian strategy; on the other, the logistical limits of Ottoman resources cast doubt on the feasibility of sustained operations in Persia.

Subsequent to the Ottoman Empire's entry into the conflict and the commencement of hostilities, Enver Pasha, stationed at Köprüköy on the Caucasian front, transmitted a cable from his headquarters. The recipients were Lieutenant Colonel Kazım Bey, overseeing the 1st Expeditionary Force (established on 11 December 1914), and Lieutenant Colonel Halil Bey, in command of the 5th Expeditionary Force (established on 25 December). The succinct message conveyed a clear directive: "Move with your division towards Persia. Progress through Tabriz to Dagestan, where you shall incite a widespread rebellion and drive the Russians from the Caspian Sea shores." This directive was not merely a tactical maneuver; it reflected Enver Pasha’s broader pan-Turanian ambitions for linking Anatolia with Turkic lands to the east, by envisioning a corridor through Persia to Azerbaijan and Central Asia, ultimately facilitating an incursion into British India. 

Enver, through Kazım Bey and Halil Bey, conveyed a message to the local populace. Their purpose in the region was not one of invasion but rather a mission to liberate Persia from the clutches of Russian dominance. Concurrently, the tides of war in Europe were turning against the Russians, a fact that was not lost on the Turkish emissaries. Ottoman proclamations in Persia thus emphasized religious solidarity and liberation, seeking to rally Persian Muslims to their cause while portraying Russia as the true aggressor.

As the Battle of Sarıkamış reached its zenith, Russian General Alexander Myshlayevsky issued a decisive order for withdrawal from Persia. Leaving behind only a solitary brigade under the command of the Armenian General Tovmas Nazarbekov, the Russians created a strategic void that beckoned the Turks forward. The opportune moment had arrived. The German leadership, meanwhile, interpreted this as proof that Persia could become the “soft underbelly” of Russian strategy, one that should be exploited with vigor.

While preparations were underway within the ranks of Halil Bey’s forces, Turkish troops, swift and resolute, had already breached the Persian frontier. Having successfully thwarted a Russian offensive, the Van Gendarmerie Division, a nimble paramilitary unit, pursued the retreating foe into Persia. On 14 December, they crossed the border, seizing the town of Kotur before advancing towards Hoy. Simultaneously, Kazım Bey and Halil Bey were tasked with progressing towards Tabriz from their established bridgehead at Kotur. The Van Gendarmerie Division, though relatively small in number, was highly mobile and equipped for rapid incursions. Nevertheless, logistical constraints and the harsh terrain of northern Persia limited the scale and sustainability of their operations, underscoring the challenges of maintaining extended campaigns in the region.

The aftermath of the Battle of Sarıkamış cast a long shadow over the Turkish advance. Morale within the ranks collapsed, and the troops available for deployment into Persia proved gravely insufficient. At the same time, the needs of the Expeditionary Forces were pressing in other directions. As a result, the 5th Expeditionary Force, which had been moving toward Persia, was diverted northward to reinforce the Third Army on 10 January 1915. Shortly thereafter, the 1st Expeditionary Force was also redirected, leaving ambitions in Persia postponed under the weight of shifting military priorities. Persia, though not fully abandoned, was relegated to a secondary theatre in the wake of the Sarıkamış disaster.

The grand plan lay shattered, albeit temporarily; yet, pockets of Turkish forces secured notable victories. On 4 January 1915, a volunteer detachment under Ömer Naci Bey, dispatched by Talat Pasha on a special mission to Persia, seized the city of Urmia. A mere week later, Ömer Fevzi Bey's Mosul Group marched into Tabriz, encountering minimal resistance. Their success, however, was fragile: these were small-scale operations without the backing of sustained logistical lines.

Realizing their mistake, the Russians swiftly marshalled their forces to reclaim the territories lost to the Turks in northern Persia. Launching an offensive, they aimed to reverse their setbacks. Tabriz, held by the Turks, succumbed to the Russians under General Chernozoubov on 30 January. The disbandment of the Mosul Group following Tabriz's fall significantly aided Russian advances. A mere three days after the city's capture, the Mosul Group was reconstituted. This sequence of rapid occupation and retreat underscored the volatility of Persia as a battleground where no power could achieve decisive control.

The Van Gendarmerie Division maintained its presence in Persian territory. On 14 January, it seized Dilman city and subsequently engaged the Russians in Hoy on two occasions, 22 and 28 January, without achieving success. However, on 3 February, during a counter-offensive led by General Nazarbekov, the Van Gendarmerie Division managed to hold its lines. These skirmishes, though tactically limited, reflected the wider competition between irregular Ottoman forces and seasoned Russian units.

In early March, Nazarbekov launched another assault with a more formidable force, totaling seven battalions. On 7 March, the Van Gendarmerie Division evacuated Dilman and commenced a strategic withdrawal, reaching Kotur three days later, where it entrenched itself. The Persians themselves watched these shifting tides of battle with a mixture of anxiety and resignation, aware that their country’s fate was being decided by external powers.

By April 1915, the 1st Expeditionary Force, under the command of Halil Bey, advanced into northern Persia amidst the tumult of the Armenian rebellion in the Van region. The primary objective of the Turkish offensive was the city of Dilman. Halil Bey aspired to rid the region of Nazarbekov’s forces, securing a crucial tactical advantage for the Turks in the Caucasian front. His forces encountered not only regular Russian troops but also faced Armenian volunteers led by General Andranik Ozanian. These Armenian volunteer units, numbering several thousand, were highly motivated and well-acquainted with the local terrain. Their operations were coordinated with British interests in the region, aiming to resist Ottoman advances and secure strategic towns in northern Persia.

On 14 April, the forces under Halil Bey launched an assault, successfully forcing the Russian and Armenian enemy to retreat to the northern reaches of Dilman. However, the triumph of that day was short-lived. The subsequent night witnessed a poorly executed raid, resulting in approximately 2,000 casualties for Halil Bey's forces.

Simultaneously, a surge in rebellion unfolded in Van, compelling the Turks to abandon Persian territory and hasten to the aid of the embattled city. By the conclusion of April, no Turkish troops remained within the borders of Persia. Halil Bey, upon receiving a cable from Enver Pasha, was instructed to depart from this theatre of war: "Van has been subdued. The roads to Bitlis and Iraq face imminent peril. To avert greater threats, effect a swift withdrawal and rendezvous with the Third Army, which shall assume command of these vital gateways."

During the rest of the year 1915, the Persian theatre lay dormant, devoid of armed hostilities. However, espionage activities surged, casting shadows over the tranquility. The Germans fortified their ties with the Persian political elite, and the German ambassador to Persia secured allegiance from the 7,000-strong Persian gendarmerie, under the tutelage of Swedish officers. Simultaneously, Wassmuss and his agents diligently garnered support among diverse Persian tribes. In Kermanshah, the Germans orchestrated the establishment of a puppet Persian government, consolidating their political influence and preparing a potential base for further operations, thereby ensuring that Persian sovereignty remained fragmented and susceptible to external manipulation.

This state of affairs did not sit well with the Allies. The Russians, backed by the 8,000-strong Persian Cossacks, swept across the northern expanse, including the capital Tehran. This compelled pro-German politicians to flee, seeking refuge initially in the sacred town of Qom and later in Kermanshah, nestled near the Ottoman border. In Kermanshah, the Germans orchestrated the establishment of a puppet Persian government. Simultaneously, Wassmuss and his agents continued to cultivate support among diverse Persian tribes and local elites, leveraging pre-existing grievances and German funding to expand their influence across both northern and southern Persia.

Meanwhile, in the southern regions, Wassmuss kindled a tribal uprising, met with formidable resistance from the South Persia Rifles, a local force commanded by British officers. The British actively supported these forces, providing arms, training, and strategic guidance to contain the rebellion. The delicate equilibrium of espionage and political maneuvers unfolded against the backdrop of a nation on the brink, caught between conflicting allegiances and the encroaching tides of war, highlighting Persia’s vulnerability to foreign intervention.

Around the same time, a Turkish force under the leadership of Rauf Bey advanced towards Kermanshah. Yet, in early June 1915, Persian insurgents, stirred by German discomfort with Turkish military presence on Persian soil, confronted this Turkish contingent near Kharind, compelling it to withdraw. The Germans, wary of Turkish operations conflicting with their own strategic ambitions in Persia, exerted considerable pressure, limiting Rauf Bey’s operational freedom. Consequently, he spent the summer navigating both local resistance and German constraints, only to receive orders from the Ottoman High Command in September to return to Khanaqin, abandoning further advances into central Persia for the time being.

While the Russians solidified their hold on Tehran, anticipation for the occupation of additional strategic locations in Persia and the eradication of German influence grew. The 1st Caucasian Cavalry Corps, led by General Nikolai Baratov, materialized for this purpose. On 12 November 1915, the corps landed in Enzeli, situated along the southwestern coast of the Caspian Sea. Concurrently, as Baratov commenced operations in Persia, the British found themselves entangled in Mesopotamia against the formidable forces led by Halil Bey. They sought an expansion of operations in Persia to divert Turkish forces, thus easing their situation in Mesopotamia.

With swift determination, Baratov's forces advanced towards Tehran, swiftly reinstalling the ousted Shah, victim of a recent coup. Pressing forward to Hamadan, they confronted and defeated pro-German tribes and small Turkish units. The Russian capture of Hamadan on 15 December 1915 proceeded seamlessly, encountering minimal resistance.

Baratov's subsequent tasks unfolded with relative ease. Kermanshah fell into Russian hands on 26 February 1916, followed by Kharind on 12 March. The absence of significant opposition facilitated the steady progression of Baratov's forces.

The focus then shifted to Khanaqin as Baratov aimed to extend Russian control. On 7 May 1916, Russian forces initiated an assault, but faced formidable resistance from Turkish units led by Şevket Bey. Compelled to withdraw, the Russians inadvertently provided the Turks with an invaluable window to fortify their defenses. Reinforcements, in the form of the 6th Division, bolstered the Turkish presence in northern Persia, marking a turning point.

The tide continued to shift with the Turkish victory in Kut, boosting morale and freeing up troops for deployment to Persia. Enver Pasha seized the opportunity, tasking Colonel Ali İhsan Bey and the XIII Corps to lead a counter-offensive. The advance began in late May, coinciding with Baratov's ambition to capture Khanaqin and potentially progress towards Baghdad, exploiting the ongoing conflicts between the Turks and the British.

On 3 June, Baratov attempted to reclaim Khanaqin, but this time the tables had turned. The Turkish XIII Corps, under the leadership of Ali İhsan Bey, not only successfully repelled Baratov's forces but also initiated a counter-offensive. Kermanshah fell to Turkish forces on 2 July, with Hamadan following suit on 10 August. Suffering significant losses, Baratov was compelled to retreat northwards, ultimately reaching the Sultan Bulak range.

In the heart of Persia, Ali İhsan's forces stood resolute, firmly entrenched within the ancient land. Meanwhile, Baratov, a seasoned commander, guided his troops in a strategic retreat, seeking a rendezvous with the British forces in Mesopotamia. However, the winds of change swept through Russia, casting a shadow on Baratov's plans. The revolution birthed discord, and soon, his forces grappled with an escalating tide of desertions. By November, as Bolsheviks initiated peace talks with the Central Powers, Baratov found himself commanding a mere shadow of his former regiment.

Persia was a part of this plan. The Army of Islam marched into Azerbaijan, while a newly formed Ninth Army, comprising the I Caucasian Corps and IV Corps, ventured into Persia under the command of Yakup Şevki Pasha. Their mission was multifaceted: to staunch the British advance, prevent aid from reaching the Bolsheviks, secure the strategic corridor from Lake Urmia to the Caspian Sea, and potentially coordinate with the Sixth Army for the Baghdad operation, reflecting the Ottoman high command’s ambition to consolidate influence in northern Persia and the wider Caucasus region.

On 8 June 1918, the IV Corps seized Tabriz, facing a formidable Armenian volunteer force of around 4,000, intent on breaking the Şahtahtı-Tabriz line and linking up with Ozanian’s troops allied with the British in Azerbaijan. A decisive moment arrived on 15 June, when the 12th Division of the IV Corps triumphed over the Armenian unit north of Dilman, securing the area. By 18 June, Dilman was firmly under Turkish control. One week later, Ozanian managed to defeat a Turkish unit and lay siege to the city of Hoy; however, the 12th Division swiftly countered, repelling Ozanian’s forces. Simultaneously, the 5th Division of the IV Corps, advancing toward Urmia, encountered resistance from a 1,500-strong Armenian force, yet Urmia eventually fell to the IV Corps on 31 July.

One week later, Ozanian managed to defeat a Turkish unit and to lay siege on the city of Hoy. The 12th Division swiftly came to the city's rescue, repelling Ozanian’s forces. Simultaneously, the 5th Division of the IV Corps, en route to Urmia, faced a setback against a 1,500-strong Armenian force. Nevertheless, Urmia succumbed to the IV Corps on 31 July.

Despite Turkish victories against Armenian forces in Persia, the burgeoning British presence in southern and central Persia effectively curtailed the Ninth Army’s further advance. By September 1918, Turkish forces had solidified control over northern Persia, spanning from Tabriz to the southern Caspian Sea shores. Yet, their expansion was constrained by British operations and the complex web of local allegiances. This dominion endured until the armistice in 1918, marking the culmination of a series of campaigns shaped not only by direct combat but also by the intricate interplay of regional powers and alliances.

PAGE LAST UPDATED ON 21 SEPTREMBER 2025