Although Arabia had been incorporated into the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century, the Sublime Porte never fully established its sovereignty over the Arabian Peninsula. Nomadic Arab tribes, resistant to pledging allegiance to a distant imperial center in Istanbul, frequently defied imperial authority. These tribes not only refrained from acknowledging Ottoman rule but also conducted raids on imperial assets and recurrently revolted against provincial governors appointed by the central administration. The inability of the Ottoman state to project sufficient military force to prevent such incursions and uprisings was compounded by its failure to institute the necessary socio-economic structures that might have enabled a transition from nomadic to sedentary life among the local population.
Insurrections proliferated particularly in mountainous regions and other peripheral areas beyond the immediate reach of the imperial government. For an extended period, the central administration’s principal strategy involved providing monetary incentives to selected tribal factions, with the dual objective of deterring rebellion and ensuring the safety of pilgrims traveling to Mecca.
By 1910 and 1911, the Arabian Peninsula, alongside Syria, had become a volatile epicenter within the Ottoman imperial domain. In Syria, local revolts emerged in reaction to central policies perceived as intrusions upon the privileges and autonomy of regional elites. In Arabia, however, the catalyst for unrest was the centralizing agenda of the Ottoman state. Policies such as census-taking, tax imposition, and the expansion of infrastructure, and most notably the Hejaz Railway linking Damascus to Medina since 1908, were perceived as infringements on local autonomy. In light of escalating unrest, the Sublime Porte deemed it essential to assert a firmer position concerning developments in the region.
During the summer of 1910, Druze groups residing in the East Jordan area launched raids on Ottoman settlements. In response, the central government dispatched a military contingent under the command of Faruk Sami Pasha to quell the uprising. Following the suppression of the Druze rebellion, Faruk Sami’s forces redirected their efforts toward Transjordan, where Bedouin insurgents posed another threat. Upon the conclusion of military operations, the Ottoman administration pivoted towards socio-economic development in the region, investing resources in its stabilization and upliftment.
In the southern provinces of Asir and Najd, where the House of Saud wielded significant influence, the Sublime Porte in 1910 intensified its military and administrative presence. The state relied on alliances with influential local figures such as Ibn Rashid of Najd and Sharif Hussein of Mecca, both of whom opposed the Saud family’s ascendance.
Concurrently, in the distant province of Yemen, where Ottoman authority remained tenuous, Imam Yahya, a hereditary leader enjoying widespread support from the Shiite population, initiated an insurrection. In 1910, he formally declared a holy war against the Ottoman Empire. The central government swiftly deployed a formidable expeditionary force under the command of Ahmet İzzet Pasha. Major İsmet Bey, later known as İsmet İnönü, recorded in his memoirs that İzzet Pasha garnered the support of local sheikhs and launched a military campaign against the rebellion. Although Ottoman forces reached the capital, San’a, within ten days, the broader campaign to pacify Yemen lasted for several months. İsmet Bey observed that the primary challenge faced by Ottoman troops was not Imam Yahya’s forces, but a devastating cholera outbreak.
After multiple engagements throughout 1911, a peace agreement was brokered between the combatants. This accord granted Imam Yahya autonomy, allowed him to maintain his religious and political influence, and included financial subsidies. In return, he agreed to refrain from initiating further hostilities in the region.
Hejaz and the Holy Cities
Situated in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, the Hejaz region held a unique status as the location of Islam’s two holiest cities: Mecca and Medina. Since the Abbasid period, authority in this region had been vested in the Sharif of Mecca, the esteemed head of the Hashimite clan, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and traditional custodians of the sacred sites. Following the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt under Sultan Selim I in 1517, the Sharif of Mecca acknowledged the supremacy of the Ottoman Caliph while retaining substantial local autonomy. Despite nominal Ottoman sovereignty, effective governance remained in the hands of the Hashemite Grand Sharifs.
A significant development occurred in November 1908 when the Ottoman government appointed Sayyid Hussein bin Ali as the new Sharif of Mecca. Upon assuming office, Sharif Hussein collaborated closely with both military and civil Ottoman officials to suppress various uprisings across the peninsula. His principal adversaries included notable figures such as Ibn Saud and Idrisi of Asir, opponents not only of the Ottoman state but also of Hussein’s aspirations for regional dominance. While Sharif Hussein sought to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to the Sultan and the Sublime Porte, he harbored significant reservations regarding centralization policies and reform efforts, which he interpreted as infringements upon his entrenched local authority.
As the prospect of global conflict loomed, Istanbul, under the control of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), sought to cultivate stronger ties with Arab tribes. Recognizing the critical importance of Sharif Hussein in stabilizing the region and influencing public sentiment, the government increasingly relied on his cooperation. By 1914, most forms of Arab dissent had been suppressed or pushed to the political periphery. Nevertheless, Istanbul’s ambitions in the Arab world faced a formidable counterforce: the expanding influence of the British Empire.
The year 1914 marked an intensification of the rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, each vying for the allegiance of Arab tribes. Rumors circulated regarding the potential unification of Arabs under a newly proclaimed Arab caliph. During this period, Sharif Abdullah, the son of Sharif Hussein, initiated diplomatic engagements with British officials stationed in Egypt. In response to these developments, the Ottoman government appointed Colonel Vehib Bey in January 1914 as both governor and military commander of Hejaz, in a bid to reinforce Istanbul’s claims over the region and underscore its authority vis-à-vis Sharif Hussein.
This appointment set the stage for increasing friction between the central government and the Sharif. Upon arriving in Medina, Vehib Bey found himself embroiled in disputes with Sharif Hussein, centered on conflicting priorities and jurisdictional boundaries. Despite the government's continued perception of Hussein as a valuable ally, there arose an urgent need to curtail his autonomy. Vehib Bey submitted a series of reports to Istanbul advocating for Hussein’s dismissal, alleging that he harbored seditious intentions and was prepared to collaborate with enemy forces in the event of an assault on the Red Sea coast.
As the Ottoman Empire, under Sultan Mehmet Reşad, entered the First World War, a significant proclamation resonated across its domains: a declaration of jihad against the Triple Entente. As Caliph, the Sultan summoned all Muslims to join the struggle, a call that formed part of the Ottoman government’s broader strategy since 1913 to mobilize Islamic sentiment in support of the war effort. This religious proclamation, however, was not intended to provoke a global Muslim insurrection against Christian powers, particularly as the Empire was allied with Christian nations such as Germany and Austria-Hungary. Instead, it aimed to bolster internal cohesion and hinder the Entente's ability to conscript and mobilize Muslim populations in their own territories.
In Mecca, Sharif Hussein publicly endorsed the call for jihad. Nevertheless, his commitment remained ambivalent, as he simultaneously entertained overtures from British representatives. Carefully navigating the political uncertainty, Hussein maintained communication with both sides, attempting to maximize his leverage.
The Arrival of Cemal Pasha
In December 1914, Cemal Pasha was appointed commander of the Fourth Army in Damascus and began preparations for a military campaign targeting the Suez Canal. He solicited the participation of Sharif Hussein, entrusting him with the command of Bedouin forces. While Hussein hesitated to offer full cooperation, he agreed to dispatch a contingent under the leadership of his son, Sharif Ali.
By February 1915, Ottoman forces were advancing toward the Suez Canal, drawing military resources from Hejaz. In this context, Hussein assured Enver Pasha that he would safeguard the sanctity of the holy cities, conditional upon the cessation of threats to his political position, particularly from Vehib Paşa, who had since been reassigned to command the Third Army in the Caucasus.
The Suez expedition ultimately ended in failure. Upon his return to Damascus in May 1915, Cemal Pasha was granted emergency powers. Exploiting documents discovered in the shuttered French consulates of Beirut and Damascus, he initiated a campaign of repression against Arab political and cultural elites. A Maronite priest known for pro-French sympathies was executed publicly for treason. Subsequently, eleven notable figures from Beirut were tried before a military tribunal in Aleyh and publicly hanged on 21 August 1915.
Cemal Pasha initiated a campaign of severe repression against Arab dissidents, employing harsh reprisals to consolidate Ottoman control. By late May 1915, Sharif Faisal, the son of Sharif Hussein, approached Cemal Pasha to declare his family’s willingness to support the Ottoman cause. This pledge of allegiance was reiterated on 10 July, when Hussein himself assured Cemal Pasha of his loyalty. At the same time, Hussein engaged in covert negotiations with Enver Pasha, who, in appreciation, instructed him to establish an Islamic Society. Enver provided both financial and military support, enabling the Sharif to promote Islamic influence across the region as part of a broader Ottoman strategy of religious mobilization.
Yet, only four days after pledging loyalty to the Ottoman-led jihad, Sharif Hussein secretly initiated correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. McMahon sought to weaken the Ottoman war effort by opening a new front in the Arabian Peninsula, exploiting its strategic vulnerabilities. This clandestine correspondence, maintained until January 1916, eventually culminated in a covert alliance between Sharif Hussein and the British directed against the Ottoman Empire.
Nevertheless, the Ottoman authorities were not entirely unaware of Hussein’s duplicity. Basri Pasha, the governor of Medina, submitted reports expressing suspicion that Sharif Ali was engaged in anti-Ottoman propaganda among the tribes. He interpreted the Sharifs’ demonstrations of goodwill as a façade designed to delay confrontation. Cemal Pasha similarly distrusted Hussein, anticipating potential betrayal in the Hejaz. To mitigate this risk, he dispatched Fahreddin Pasha, commander of the XII Corps, to Medina. Thus, the stage was set for a complex struggle of shifting alliances and betrayals within the larger trajectory of late Ottoman history.
"According to an article in Temps newspaper, Sharif Hussein had made a deal with the British as early as 1 January 1916 and he waiting for an opportunity to declare his revolt. At that time, if I had been aware of the situation, I would immediately have Sharif Faisal arrested in Damascus and Sharif Ali arrested in Medina. I would even send a Turkish division to Mecca to detain Sharif Hussein and his other sons. In that way I could have suppressed this cursed rebellion before it even broke out. However, I had no concrete evidence whatsoever to prove the wrongdoings of these traitors." (Cemal Pasha in his memoirs)
The Arab Revolt
By May 1916, Cemal Pasha had recognized Hussein’s intentions with clarity. He immediately telegraphed Basri Pasha and Fahreddin Pasha, instructing them to adopt defensive positions, reinforce the railway garrisons, and avoid any premature military engagement. On 22 May, reinforcements departed from Syria en route to Medina.
During the night of 23–24 May, Hussein launched the Arab Revolt by ordering attacks on Ottoman outposts surrounding Medina. Shortly thereafter, rebel forces extended their operations, bombarding the port city of Jiddah. The British navy in the Red Sea provided artillery support, tipping the balance in favor of the rebels. The Ottoman garrison in Jiddah, consisting of two infantry regiments and a mountain battery, resisted for a week before capitulating under sustained assault.
In Medina, Ottoman reinforcements arrived at the end of May, establishing the Hejaz Expeditionary Force under the command of Fahreddin Pasha. This unit was created to resist Hussein’s forces, who numbered around 50,000 men but possessed only 10,000 rifles. The bulk of Hussein’s supporters were nomadic tribesmen, while the urban populations of Mecca, Taif, and Jiddah exhibited little enthusiasm for his cause. In reality, support for the revolt remained geographically limited to the Hejaz and nearby tribal regions. Hussein’s base consisted of a relatively small number of tribesmen funded by the British treasury, supplemented by a few foreign officers, including Allied prisoners of war and expatriates residing in British-controlled territories.
Despite these constraints, Hussein’s forces achieved notable advances. By late September 1916, the Arab rebels had successfully captured the Red Sea coastal towns of Rabegh, Yenbo, and Qunfida.
In response, the Ottoman government adopted a dual strategy. On the propaganda front, efforts were made to discredit Hussein throughout the Arab provinces. Sharif Haydar was appointed the legitimate Emir of Mecca in August 1916, assuming his position in Medina, in an attempt to rally Arab loyalty against Hussein.
Militarily, the Ottoman command initially shifted from a defensive to an offensive strategy, contemplating an advance on Mecca, then under Hussein’s control. On 14 September 1916, Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha convened in Syria to discuss the matter. However, the urgent need for reinforcements in Palestine to resist the advancing British prompted a revision of plans. The proposed attack on Mecca was abandoned, and priority was given to holding Medina defensively.
Meanwhile, Ottoman positions in both Palestine and the Hejaz began to deteriorate. In October 1916, the British dispatched Captain T.E. Lawrence as their liaison officer with Hussein’s forces. Lawrence successfully coordinated naval support for the Arabs, which proved decisive in repelling the Ottoman assault on Yenbo in December 1916. He persuaded Hussein’s sons, Faisal and Abdullah, to redirect their efforts away from Medina and instead focus on sabotage operations against the Hejaz Railway. On 3 January 1917, Faisal launched a northward campaign along the Red Sea coast towards Wejh. After two days of fighting, the Ottoman garrison evacuated, retreating towards Medina and thereby conceding a strategically vital position.
By early 1917, momentum had shifted in favor of the Arab rebels. Their logistical organization ensured steady supplies across the desert, while Ottoman forces retreated to defensive positions in Medina, maintaining only scattered detachments along the Hejaz Railway. Facing severe setbacks, Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha considered withdrawing entirely from the Hejaz in order to concentrate resources in Palestine.
Nevertheless, the symbolic and religious importance of the holy cities, under Ottoman rule for nearly four centuries, rendered such a decision politically fraught. Sultan Mehmed Reşad, supported by Talat Pasha and Fahreddin Pasha, opposed withdrawal and advocated for continued defense of Medina. It was decided that only the sick and wounded would be evacuated, together with sacred Islamic relics sent to Istanbul, while the remainder of the garrison would remain.
One high-profile departure did occur as Sharif Haydar, the newly appointed Emir of Mecca, left Medina on 14 March 1917 due to security concerns. This departure symbolized the deepening crisis in Ottoman authority across the Arabian Peninsula.
Defending Medina
The city of Medina soon came under siege. Sharif Abdullah’s headquarters, strategically located, obstructed Ottoman supply lines, depriving the garrison of reinforcements. Arab camel-mounted cavalry, supported by the British, carried out repeated attacks on Ottoman positions. Lawrence played a crucial role, not only by offering military advice but also by recruiting tribes outside the revolt, distributing British gold to secure their allegiance.
On 12 July 1917, Aqaba, the last Ottoman port on the Red Sea, fell to Hussein’s forces, thereby ensuring a steady influx of British supplies. After Aqaba’s capture, Lawrence travelled to Cairo to coordinate with General Allenby, facilitating cooperation between Arab rebels and British forces in Palestine. This marked a decisive strategic shift, linking the Arab Revolt in the Hejaz with British campaigns in Syria and Palestine.
In the Hejaz, Medina remained under siege, defended by a dwindling Ottoman garrison commanded by Fahreddin Pasha. Cut off from essential provisions, Fahreddin Pasha wrote to Mustafa Kemal Pasha on 7 March 1918, lamenting that his troops received only 2,000 calories per day, their animals were dying at a rate of five per day, and supply needs far outstripped availability. He pleaded: "Please, do not let Medina fall just because of hunger."
“We were not concerned about those bandits and their cooperators who were surrounding us. What we were affected by was the difficulty in finding bread. In those sacred lands, there were plenty of dates growing, but that was all. Nothing else to feed ourselves with. But suddenly we saw that blessings were pouring down from the sky!” What this officer saw as blessing was grasshoppers. Having no option left, Fahreddin Pasha had to order his men to eat grasshoppers. In a decree he issued, he stated that grasshoppers contain nutrition and they taste like birds. He even provided guidelines on how to cook grasshoppers: Boil them. Take away the heads and legs. Mix them with rice. Serve with lemon and olive oil. Such were the living conditions of the Turkish troops who remained in Medina to defend the holy city of Islam." (Memoirs of Feridun Bey, an officer who was in Medina at the time)
The Turkish forces persisted in their struggle, engaging in ongoing skirmishes with Arab rebels amidst the desert encompassing Medina. Although assistance was beyond reach, Istanbul remained cognizant of the unfolding events.
"With what hope did you undertake the defense of Medina? At that time we could find no reason other than your adherence to Islam… Everybody was desperate, everybody was hopeless about Medina. It was only you, who were happy and smiling. Today the fronts are far from being enjoyable. Medina had to be evacuated and every single remaining soldier had to be sent to Gaza. You were not happy about this: Don’t let me take down the banner raised by Sultan Selim with my own hand. How many soldiers can you sacrifice for Medina, one thousand, three thousand? Give me what you can and I will not let a single foreigner, that’s what you said. But they withdrew all the forces. What is left to you was a handful of heroes. Today you are defending our sacred city with these heroes, who are already sacrificed." (Falih Rıfkı Bey, who had also served in Syria as an officer in Cemal Pasha’s Fourth Army, in his article in the newspaper Akşam, 30 November 1918)
Fahreddin Pasha and his men remained determined to defend the city until the war’s end. However, the situation changed dramatically on 31 October 1918, when Ahmet İzzet Pasha, the Ottoman Chief of Staff, circulated a cable announcing the signing of the Armistice of Mudros: “We signed an agreement with the Entente powers to be effective as of today, 31 October 1918, afternoon. Representatives of the mentioned states informed their armies in Bulgaria, Syria and Iraq about this issue. Conditions of the agreement must be strictly adhered to and the receipt of this correspondence must be confirmed. Details to be provided later.”
On 6 November, İzzet Pasha sent a direct cable to Fahreddin Pasha, acknowledging his sacrifices but ordering compliance with the armistice: “After having done all kinds of sacrifices for religion and honour for four years, the fact that our alliance lost the war forced the Ottoman state to sign an armistice with the Entente. According to one of the clauses of the armistice, Ottoman units and garrisons in Hejaz, Asir and Yemen have to surrender to the nearest Entente commander. It is certainly acknowledged that for you, my comrades in arms who have been executing their duty of honour for years, agreeing with such a terrible condition can only result from the patriotic feeling of saving the motherland from definitive death. I am sure that you will crown your sacrifices, which are appreciated even by our enemies, by fully complying with this heavy task.”
Fahreddin Pasha, however, resisted the order to surrender Medina. He repeatedly delayed responding to government communications, evading compliance. War Minister Cevat Pasha issued the order again on 28 November, and personally sent Captain Ziya Bey on 8 December to deliver it.
A critical meeting was held on 27 December, where Fahreddin Pasha gathered his officers to deliberate. The staff was divided, some remained committed to defending Medina at all costs, while others, led by Lieutenant Colonel Emin Bey, argued that resistance was futile and advocated surrender to minimize losses. Consensus could not be reached.
The impasse was broken on 5 January 1919, when Colonel Ali Necip Bey of the 58th Division informed Fahreddin Pasha that while the officers remained loyal to his authority, they collectively saw no viable alternative to surrender. After further deliberation, Fahreddin reluctantly agreed.
On 7 January 1919, over two months after the armistice, representatives of Ottoman, Arab, and British forces signed an agreement outlining the evacuation of Medina and the withdrawal of Ottoman troops. On 10 January, Fahreddin Pasha formally departed Medina after visiting the holy sites. His reluctance to leave was overcome only when his officers forcibly compelled him to comply, seizing him in an emotional confrontation, as recounted by Feridun Bey:
“At that moment, those who were begging him looked at each other realizing that the time has come to execute a decision that was already made. Suddenly they seized they surrounded the Pasha and, without being able to stop the tears falling from their eyes, they seized him… Facing this collective act of his closest commanders, Fahreddin Pasha had nothing left to do but to succumb to his fate in deep sorrow.” (Feridun Bey in his memoirs)
The surrender marked the end of the Ottoman presence in Medina. A total of 654 officers, 6,000 soldiers, 30,000 rifles, 75 machine guns, and 22 artillery pieces were handed over. Fahreddin Pasha and his men were sent as prisoners to Cairo, in violation of the terms agreed with the Arabs and British.
After the war, Cemal Pasha, reflecting in his memoirs, characterized the Arab Revolt as a disaster for the Arab world, branding Sharif Hussein a traitor to both Arab and Muslim identity. He argued that Hussein’s actions represented not liberation but collaboration with imperialist powers to secure his own ambitions.
In Turkish collective memory, the Arab Revolt remains remembered with bitterness, often encapsulated in the phrase “the Arabs stabbed us in the back.” Yet historical evidence complicates this perception. No Arab units of the Ottoman army defected to Hussein, nor did leading Arab political or military figures openly support his revolt. In fact, the majority of Arabs remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire, bound by shared Islamic identity.
PAGE LAST UPDATED ON 4 JANUARY 2024